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Abstract 
We develop a welfare framework, which explicitly recognizes that research protected 
by intellectual property rights generates monopoly profits. The result is a simulation 
model, shaped to the European sugar sector, and enabling to assess the size and 
distribution of the benefits of transgenic sugar beet adoption in the European Union 
(EU) and the Rest of the World (ROW). Our model results suggest that the ROW 
captures the largest share of the benefits (53 % of total welfare increase). The EU 
sugar industry absorbs the next largest share of the benefits (30 %), with the smallest 
share (17 %) accruing to seed suppliers and gene developers. Since EU intervention 
prices are exogenously fixed each year, EU consumers do not take part in the 
distribution of the gains from the innovation. However, consumers outside the EU 
necessarily gain due to the depressing effect of the technology on world sugar prices. 
The latter is costly for cane growers in the ROW, while beet producers gain. Our 
results reveal an apparent contradiction. When modern (bio)technologies are 
introduced in commodity markets subject to obsolete trade policies, the natural flow 
of domestic benefits from the input industry, via farmers, to consumers is hampered 
and biased towards the producing sector (input industry, farmers, and processors), 
leaving domestic consumers unaffected. Remarkably, given the current Common 
Market Organization for sugar, consumers outside the EU gain while EU citizens 
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Introduction 
Since 1995, genetically modified organisms (GMO’s) have been introduced 
commercially into US agriculture. These innovations are developed and 
commercialized by a handful of vertically coordinated “life science” firms who have 
fundamentally altered the structure of the seed industry. Enforcement of intellectual 
property rights (IPR’s) for biological innovations has been the major incentive for a 
concentration tendency in the upstream sector. On the one hand, this monopolization 
may increase long-run social welfare through an increased rate of investment in R&D 
(Schumpeter, 1942). On the other hand, due to their monopoly power, these firms are 
capable of charging a ‘monopoly price’, extracting a part of the total social welfare 
through ‘monopoly rents’ (Moschini and Lapan, 1997). A popular argument used by 
the opponents of agricultural biotechnology is the idea of an input industry extracting 
all benefits generated by these innovations. Are life science firms able to appropriate 
all benefits or is there a limit to their monopoly power?   
 
In the US, the first published ex post welfare studies reveal that both farmers and gene 
developers, depending on the commodity, can receive the lion share of the benefits 
(Moschini et al., 2000, Falck-Zepeda et al., 2000b). However, up to now no parallel 
ex ante study has been published for the European Union (EU). Hence, the EUWAB-
project (European Union Welfare effects of Agricultural Biotechnology) aims at 
calculating the total benefits of agricultural biotechnology innovations in the EU and 
their distribution among member countries, producers, consumers, input suppliers and 
government. The project tries to answer these questions by means of two carefully 
selected case studies: (1) herbicide tolerant (HT) sugar beets, and (2) insect resistant 
(IR) corn.   5
In this paper, we show that the EU’s sugar market can serve as a relevant case study 
for the calculation of the ex ante welfare effects of agricultural biotechnology in the 
EU. We develop a partial equilibrium welfare framework, which explicitly recognizes 
that research protected by intellectual property rights generates monopoly profits 
(Moschini and Lapan, 1997). The result is a simulation model, which is shaped to the 
characteristics of the EU’s Common Market Organization (CMO) for sugar. This 
model enables to assess the size and distribution of the potential benefits of transgenic 
sugar beet adoption in the European Union and the Rest of the World. 
 
Arguments Advancing the European Union’s Sugar Market as a Case Study 
Until now, the few published studies calculating the welfare effects of agricultural 
biotechnology are applied on typical US export crops like cotton (Falck-Zepeda et al., 
2000b) and soybeans (Moschini et al., 2000, Falck-Zepeda et al., 2000a). The major 
difference with the EU is the fact that these American studies regard an ex post 
setting, while the recent moratoriums on GMO’s in the EU and the absence of 
empirical farm level impact data oblige us to use ex ante assumptions about expected 
yield increases, cost reductions and price premiums of the new technology. However, 
this limitation makes it particularly interesting, because studying the potential welfare 
effects associated with agricultural biotechnology in the EU reveals the benefits 
foregone or costs of a complete ban of GMO’s in the EU. 
 
To illustrate these potential benefits, a representative case study has to be selected. 
Since the technology is embedded in the seed, an agricultural commodity has to be 
chosen, which is representative and important for the EU, in terms of production and 
export, and preferably for the majority of EU member countries. Moreover, the   6 
innovation has to be commercialized in other countries or be near commercialization 
in order to obtain preliminary information about its potential impact via field trial 
data. Further, a minimal acceptance for the technology is a requisite, so that adoption 
in the intermediate run is a realistic scenario for the EU. The case of genetically 
engineered animal growth hormones, such as rBST (recombinant bovine 
Somatotropin) in the dairy sector, fulfils these criteria, but is unlikely to be accepted 
by the European society in the coming years. The case of transgenic sugar beets is in 
line with our criteria, providing a perfect example of agricultural biotechnology in an 
important European commodity market, parallel with the existing US impact studies 
mentioned above.  
 
At present, cane sugar accounts for 71 % of global sugar production, with beet sugar 
accounting for 29 % of global output (Table 1). The EU is the world’s largest beet 
sugar producer, producing 49 % of global beet sugar (Table 2). The European 
continent even accounts for 79 %. Brazil and the EU are the largest sugar exporters, 
responsible for 20 % of global traded sugar each (Table 1). Since transgenic sugar 
beets are not yet adopted on a commercial scale neither in the EU, nor in other parts 
of the world, no ex post studies are available. However up to now, no ex ante study 
has been published yet about the potential welfare effects of agricultural 
biotechnology in the sugar sector. 
 
Sugar is one of the most heavily traded and highly protected agricultural commodities 
with a world-wide average Producer Subsidy Equivalent (PSE) of 48 % (International 
Policy Council, 1996). However, because of the residual nature of world sugar 
markets, recorded prices not always reflect production costs in some of the largest   7
producing countries. For long periods of time, the world sugar price cycle has been 
characterized by depressed prices at which even the world’s most efficient producers 
had difficulties to survive without protection. Hence, current PSE calculations are 
likely to overstate levels of support in the sugar sector, while revealing little about the 
distorted nature of world markets (Harris and Tangermann, 1993). There is general 
agreement that EU sugar policies depress the world sugar market price . The EU’s 
Common Market Organization (CMO) for sugar came into full effect in 1968 and has 
not been substantially altered since that time. The principal mechanism by which 
producers have been supported is a common internal support price. The quotas were 
introduced on a temporary basis, to be removed after seven years. They have been 
maintained ever since, however, subject to periodic review (Harris and Tangermann, 
1993). An important implication for our study is that these market interventions 
distort the flow of benefits from R&D in agriculture, such as biotechnology research 
(Alston et al., 1995).  
 
With the recent WTO agreements, trade barriers and other market interventions are 
being reduced gradually. In the case of the sugar sector, the WTO agreement 
establishes limits on subsidized exports. The EU has agreed to reduce production 
quotas to meet its subsidized exports obligations (Poonyth et al., 2000). Previous 
studies (Sudaryanto, 1987, Wong et al., 1989, Roningen and Dixit, 1989, Schmitz and 
Vercammen, 1990, Leuck and Neff, 1991, Roberts and Wish-Wilson, 1993, Devadoss 
and Kropf, 1996, Borrell and Pearce, 1999) evaluated the implications of trade 
liberalization on the world sugar market. The latter would have an important effect on 
the volume of EU production, although the European beet industry as a whole has 
shown to be relatively competitive (Haley, 1998, Kennedy and Harrison, 1999).    8 
The sugar industry is facing a slow but steady progress towards greater liberalization 
of global trade. Over the last 40 years, real world sugar prices have fallen, on average, 
by between 1.5 % and 2.0 % per year (Duff, 1999). Even in the case of the highly 
protected European beet industry, growers are paid a fixed ‘green rate’ price, i.e. not 
corrected for inflation. This means that they have to compete continuously against this 
real price decline of 1.88 % per year via technological progress
1. These arguments 
provide a powerful economic rationale for enhancing competitiveness by exploiting 
any cost savings that can be achieved through the use of genetically modified (GM) 
crops. However, Table 3 reveals that, although most European countries have 
sufficient research experience in GM beets, no authorization or commercialization of 
these crops is expected before 2002-2005. Yet, most sugar industries have not even 
adopted a strategy for this technology. GM sugar beet is already approved
2 to be 
grown in the USA, and will shortly be grown in China. It cannot be long before South 
Africa follows suite. Clearly, it is wise for the EU to take a careful, rational, science-
based look at all the economic, agricultural and environmental issues involved (Dewar 
et al., 2000). This advances the elaboration of an ex ante study about the potential 
welfare effects of agricultural biotechnology in the sugar sector of the European 
Union. 
 
Previous Studies Examining the Returns to R&D in the European Sugar Sector 
Up to date, only two studies have been published estimating the returns to R&D in 
European sugar production. Thirtle (1999) uses an R&D production function 
approach for the Eastern counties of England to explain total factor productivity 
(TFP) growth in sugar production. He finds a significant influence of R&D on TFP, 
lagged six and nine years after the research expenditure. The overall rate of return to   9
publicly funded agricultural research amounts to 11 %. However, since R&D in 
agriculture is progressively managed by the private sector, e.g. with the advent of 
biotechnology, increased private extension and marketing expenditures could reduce 
the adoption lag of innovations and significantly increase producers’ rate of return.  
 
According to Zimmermann and Zeddies (2000), 58 % of the global productivity 
progress in the Bavarian region of Germany is attributed to sugar beet seed. 
Moreover, 80 % of the increase in beet yield can be attributed to seed improvements 
and approximately 20 % to other production factors, especially plant protection and 
machinery (Märländer, 1991). These figures suggest that progress in sugar beet 
breeding can generate remarkable economic benefits, especially biotechnology that 
marries seed with plant protection improvements. 
 
Transgenic Sugar beets 
Effective weed control is essential for economic sugar beet production in all growing 
areas of the world (Loock et al., 1998). This was recognized as soon as the crop was 
first grown (Achard, 1799). Yield losses can be up to 100 %, such is the poor ability 
of beet to compete with the large range of weeds present in arable soils (Dewar et al., 
2000). A survey on changes in weed control techniques in Europe between 1980 and 
1998 revealed that (1) the number of possibilities to control weeds has increased, 
while (2) the frequency of sprayings increased, (3) the quantity of herbicides per 
hectare decreased, and (4) weed control techniques shifted gradually from pre-
emergence towards post-emergence application, combined with reduced tillage 
practices (Schäufele, 2000). The post-emergence herbicides glyphosate and 
glufosinate-ammonium provide a broader spectrum of weed control in sugar beet than   10 
current weed control systems, while at the same time reducing the number of active 
ingredients used in the beet crop. As a result, glyphosate and glufosinate-ammonium 
have better environmental and toxicological profiles than most of the herbicides they 
replace (May, 2000).  
 
Glyphosate was first introduced as an herbicide in 1971. New genetic modification 
technology has allowed the production of sugar beets tolerant to these herbicides. The 
gene that confers tolerance to glyphosate was discovered in a naturally occurring soil 
bacterium. This bacterium produces an enzyme, which prevents glyphosate from 
attacking another enzyme called EPSPS that controls the production of essential 
amino acids in the plant, and without which the plant would die. The gene was 
isolated using microbiological techniques, and introduced into the beet genome using 
the gene transfer technology.  
 
Glufosinate-ammonium was discovered in 1981. The gene that confers tolerance to 
glufosinate was also discovered from a naturally occurring soil bacterium and 
introduced into the beet’s genome, accompanied by an antibiotic ‘marker’ gene that 
confers resistance to kanamycin to allow selection of transformed cells in tissue 
culture (Dewar et al., 2000).  
 
Two commercial herbicide tolerant (HT) sugar beet varieties resulted from these 
genetic insertion techniques: (1) a Roundup Ready ™ variety, tolerant to glyphosate 
and developed by Monsanto, and (2) a Liberty Link ™ variety, tolerant to glufosinate-
ammonium and developed by Aventis
3. These kits composed of a transgenic variety 
combined with a post-emergence herbicide, offer farmers a number of potential   11
benefits in weed management. Apart from broad-spectrum weed control, it offers 
flexibility in the timing of applications, compared to the existing programs, and will 
reduce the need for complex compositions of spray solutions. For most growers, 
herbicide tolerant sugar beets are likely to result in cheaper weed control than current 
systems (May, 2000). 
 
Moreover, these innovations are entirely coherent within the ongoing trend towards 
post-emergence weed control and reduced tillage techniques and the sharpening of the 
legal constraints for the application of herbicides, especially concerning the protection 
of the user and the environment (Schäufele, 2000). Both herbicides have a low 
toxicity and are metabolized fast and without residues in the soil. As a result, the 
introduction of herbicide tolerant sugar beet varieties could be an approach to 




To analyze the welfare effects of the trading and adoption of herbicide tolerant sugar 
beets in the sugar industry, we need to choose an appropriate spatial model. 
Therefore, a preliminary look at the geographical distribution of production and trade 
of sugar is in order. Since we are analyzing a hypothetical adoption period of five 
agricultural seasons, i.e. 1996/97-2000/01, Table 1 reports the observed average 
production, exports, net exports, stock changes, and consumption of sugar in the 
world during this period. A first differentiation into sugar cane and sugar beet appears 
logic, accounting for respectively 71 % and 29 % of global sugar production. The 
sugar beet region can be further divided into the EU and the Rest of the World   12 
(ROW), both responsible for half of global beet sugar (Table 2). In this ROW beet 
region, non-EU Europe is dominant (58 %), followed by the US (21 %). Hence, we 
believe that we can adequately capture the essence of production and trade in the 
global sugar market with a three-region model: EU, ROW Beet, and ROW Cane. 




Conventionally, research benefits were estimated assuming that the research is 
publicly funded and innovated inputs competitively sold in the input market. In 
contrast, most of the recent agricultural biotechnology innovations have been 
developed by private firms protected by intellectual property rights (IPR’s), such as 
patents, which confer monopoly rights to the discoverer (with some limitations). This 
is a new phenomenon in the agribusiness sector. The result is that prices for these 
inputs are higher than they would be in a perfectly competitive market. Therefore, 
Moschini and Lapan (1997) bring along some new elements in the conventional 
analytical framework. They complete it by including the possibility that the 
innovation is protected by IPR’s in the input market. Thus, the benefits from modern 
biotechnological R&D have to be measured in the input market. However, 
equivalently to what Falck-Zepeda, Traxler, and Nelson (2000b) pointed out in their 
study about the welfare effects of Bt cotton in the US, econometric implementation of 
Marshallian welfare estimations in the input market would require data that are 
difficult to obtain, particularly for recent innovations and especially for our ex ante 
evaluation.  
   13
Therefore, in a more recent paper Moschini, Lapan and Sobolevski (2000) adapt their 
methodology to a model that is closer to the actual working of the herbicide tolerance 
innovation and apply it to the case of Roundup Ready™ soybeans. Inspired by the 
latter, we develop a two dimensional model and apply it on the European Union’s 
sugar industry. The spatial dimension is defined by 16 regions i: the sugar cane 
growers in the Rest of the World (ROW) (i = 0), the sugar beet growers in the ROW (i 
= 1), and 14 production blocks
4 in the EU (i = 2, 3, …, 15) (Table 4). The temporal 
dimension includes 7 agricultural seasons j: one ‘benchmark year’ 1996-1997 without 
adoption (j = 0), five sequential years of adoption (j = 1, 2, …, 5): 1996-1997, 1997-
1998, …, 2000-2001 (Table 5), and one ‘evaluation year’ 2001-2002 (j = 6) to which 
the aggregate welfare increases engendered during the adoption period, are actualized 
and aggregated. 
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Supply of land to the sugar industry by country i in year j is written in constant-
elasticity form as a function of average land rents, which depend on output price and 
the adoption rate, that is 
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The result is a region- and year-specific supply function incorporating four 
technology-specific parameters enabling to parameterize the herbicide tolerance 
innovation  in  detail:          (5) 
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General Parameters  Technology-Specific Parameters 
p = sugar price  
λ = 16x6 matrix of scale parameters 
A, G = 16x6 matrices of parameters subsuming all 
other input prices, presumed constant 
η = 16x1 vector of elasticities of yield with 
respect to sugar price 
δw  = 16x6 matrix of seed costs (δ = constant 
optimal density of seeds and w = seed price) 
θ = 16x6 matrix of elasticities of land supply with 
respect to sugar profit per hectare 
α = 16x6 matrix of coefficients 
of unit profit increase due to the 
HT technology 
β = 16x1 vector of coefficients 
of yield change due to the HT 
technology 
ρ ∈ [0,1] = adoption rate 
µ = 16x6 matrix of markups on 
HT seed price (reflecting 
technology fee) 
 
Aggregation of supply functions will allow us to model the effect on world sugar 
prices of the interaction between two aggregate blocks, the EU and the ROW, as a 
consequence of the introduction of the HT technology. However, the structure of 
these functions implies that all 16 regions in the model are able to participate in the 
aggregate supply response to prices. While all regions certainly respond to a certain 
region-specific ‘incentive price’, in reality not all of them respond to world prices, 
average profit per hectare π  
aggregate supply of land to sugar beet production
(optimal) yield function   15
due to price interventions interfering in their domestic market
5. This means that the 
technology-induced production surplus of those regions will not be exported on the 
world market, but will free up land allocated to sugar beets instead, so that their total 
production remains unchanged
6. For those regions, we include this possibility by 
equaling their supply functions to their (constant) observed total production: 
  j i j i Q p Q , , ) , ( = ρ          ( 6 )  
For regions i responding to world prices, we parameterize the introduction of HT 
sugar beets using equation 5. The aggregate EU sugar
7 supply function in year j can 
be modeled by imputing the country- and year-specific adoption rates ρi,j in the 
variable  ρ and adding up all country-specific supply functions. Note that this 
aggregate supply function contains a constant term and a variable term, which is a 
function of world prices: 
) , ( ) , ( ) , ( , , , ,
15
2
, , , j i j i j i j i
i
j i j EU j EU p Q Q p Q p Q ρ ρ ρ ∑ ∑ ∑ + = =
=
  (7) 
In equation (7)  j EU, ρ  represents the 14x1 adoption vector of the new technology in 
the EU in year j, with elements ρi,j (i = 2, 3, …, 15). This aggregate sugar supply 
function is very detailed in that it contains 10 parameters per country, totaling 140 
parameters, of which 56 are related to the new technology. In an analogous way, 
ROW aggregate supply in year j can be modeled as a function containing a constant 
term and a variable term, which is a function of world prices: 
  ) , ( ) , ( ) , ( , , , ,
1
0
, , , j i j i j i j i
i
j i j ROW j ROW p Q Q p Q p Q ρ ρ ρ ∑ ∑ ∑ + = =
=
   (8) 
This function contains 20 parameters, of which 8 are technology-specific. In equation 
(8)  j ROW, ρ  represents the 2x1 adoption vector of the new technology in the ROW in   16 
year j with elements ρi,j (i = 0, 1). The 16x1 adoption vector in the whole world in 
year j will be denoted by  j W, ρ , containing elements ρi,j (i = 0, 1, …, 15). 
 
Next, we model the innovation as occurring in a large, open economy with technology 
spillovers and shape the two-region framework of Alston, Norton and Pardey (1995) 
(p. 219) to the specific features of the European Union’s Common Market 
Organization (CMO) for sugar (Figure 1). For each country, the four technology-
specific parameters engender a pivotal, divergent shift of the supply curve. Depending 
on the pricing system (two-tier or mixed price) which Member States apply, the 
research benefits can differ (Demont and Tollens, 2001). In this paper however, we do 
not attempt to model different pricing systems and assume that their effect on the flow 
of R&D benefits is negligible. It is clear that in all cases, producers extract a part of 
research benefits, which is protected from price depreciations
8 due to guaranteed EU 
intervention prices. At the center of the analysis is the calculation of a counterfactual 
world price pj (after decline) in year j to isolate the effect of the technology-induced 
supply shift from other exogenous changes in supply and demand. It is important to 
note that this price change would differ from the observed change in world price if the 
technology had been adopted as assumed. It rather represents what the world price 
would have been if all supply and demand conditions had been identical except for the 
introduction of the new technology (Falck-Zepeda et al., 2000b). Hence, in our 
analysis we will represent the world price as a function of the worldwide adoption 
vector: pj(ρW,j).  
 
If we assume a constant elasticity EU demand function for sugar: 
j EU p p D j EU j EU
,
, , ) (
ε κ
− = ,       (9)   17
the EU’s export supply curve in year j can be modeled as  
j j EU j EU j EU j EU j EU j EU j C p Q p D p Q p ES − = − = ) , ( ) ( ) , ( ) , ( , , , , , , ρ ρ ρ  (10) 
with Cj the fixed consumption level in year j, due to yearly fixed intervention prices.  
 
The world price reduction (from pj(0) to pj(ρW,j) in Figure 1) is a synergy of two 
forces. First, the EU’s export supply expansion
9 (from ESj(p,0) to ESj(p,ρEU,j)), due to 
a technology-induced pivotal shift of the EU’s aggregate supply function (from 
QEU,j(p,0) to QEU,j(p,ρEU,j)), would cause the world price to decline from pj(0) to 
pj(ρEU,j). This price decrease can be determined using a reduced form equation, 
extracted from the FAPRI’s world sugar model by Poonyth et al. (2000), which 
calculates the world sugar price as a function of actual and lagged EU net sugar 
exports:          (11) 
] ) , ( log[ 46 . 0 ] ) , ( log[ 0 . 1 )] ( log[ 1 , 1 , , − − − + − − = j j EU j j j EU j j EU j M p ES M p ES p ρ ρ ρ  
with Mj the sugar imports in year j. By taking the first differential, and if we assume 
that imports are not affected by the innovation, due to fixed ACP import 
arrangements, we can calculate the world price as a function of the EU’s technology-
induced export supply expansion. For each year j the model transforms the observed 
world price pj(0) into the world price pj(ρEU,j) that would result from the EU’s 
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with σ1 = -1.0 and σ2  =  0.46        (12) 
 
The short-run flexibility σ1 is -1 and the long-run flexibility is approximately half that 
of the short-run (σ1 + σ2 = -0.54), reflecting sugar export demand elasticities that are   18 
approximately twice as large in the long run as in the short run (Poonyth et al., 2000). 
The positive value for the coefficient σ2 of the lagged technology-induced export 
supply expansion term reflects the output contraction of the ROW as a reaction on the 
world price decline from pj(0) to pj(ρEU,j). Inclusion of this reaction transforms our 
static model into a dynamic equilibrium displacement model. 
 
Secondly, the ROW technology-induced output expansion, which equals the export 
demand contraction, would further reduce the world price from pj(ρEU,j) to the 
counterfactual world price pj(ρW,j). We assume a constant elasticity ROW demand 
function for sugar: 
j ROW p p D j ROW j ROW
,
, , ) (
ε κ
− =       ( 1 3 )  
The positive ROW supply shift (from QROW,j(p,0) to QROW,j(p,ρROW,j) in Figure 1) 
translates into a negative export demand shift (from EDj(p,0) to ED(p,ρROW,j)): 
EDj(p,0) = DROW,j(p) – QROW,j(p,0)     (14) 
EDj(p,ρROW,j) = DROW,j(p) – QROW,j(p,ρROW,j)     (15) 
Market clearing at equilibrium in the world market implies: 
MCj(p,ρW,j) = ESj(p,ρEU,j) – EDj(p,ρROW,j) = 0     (16) 
Root calculation of the market clearing constraint in equation 18 finally yields an 
estimate of the counterfactual world price pj(ρW,j), which is essentially a function of 
the global adoption vector ρW,j: 
pj(ρW,j) = root[MCj(p,ρW,j),p]      (17) 
 
The overall world price change (from pj(0) to pj(ρW,j)) can now be transmitted to EU 
domestic prices using the principles of the European Union’s Common Market 
Organization (CMO) for sugar. The basic Regulation for the organization is   19
Regulation (EEC) No 1785/81 (European Commission, 1996). Regulation (EC) No 
1101/95 extends the production arrangements to the marketing year 2000-2001. The 




j EU p , ) and target prices (about 5 % higher) for sugar and prices for 
beet. Intervention is opened for limited quantities under a quota for which the price 
guarantee is almost full (A quota) and a quota for which the price guarantee is partial 
(B quota). The basic beet price is fixed annually in the light of the intervention price 
for white sugar and standard amounts representing the processing margin, the yield, 
the receipts of refineries from sales of molasses and, where appropriate, the cost 
incurred in delivering beet to refineries. The minimum price is fixed each year for beet 
processed into sugar and is the minimum price that sugar manufacturers are obliged to 
pay to producers for the purchase of beet. Since the EU production quotas are based 
on historic national production levels, their relationship varies widely between 
European member countries. Anticipating an increase in consumption, the quotas  j a Q ,  
for A sugar and  j b Q ,  for B sugar) are set at a higher level than internal consumption 
Cj, the internal demand (DEU,j) at the intervention price
i
j EU p ,  (Figure 1). This 
overproduction  j d Q ,  (=  j a Q , +  j b Q ,  – Cj), although receiving a guaranteed B sugar 
price
b
j EU p , , is exported on the world market and hence subsidized. This export 
subsidy system is completely auto-financed by levies on A and B quota production. 
Consumers, who pay a high internal intervention price
i
j EU p , , subsidize the internal 
within-quota production. A levy 
a
j τ of maximum 2 % of the intervention price applies 
on the entire (A + B) within-quota production. Moreover, B quota production receives 
an additional, more variable, levy 
b
j τ  of maximum 37.5 % of the intervention price.   20 
Sugar manufacturers and sugar beet growers pay the levies in accordance with the 
income they obtain from sugar, i.e. 40 % and 60 % respectively (European 
Commission, 1996). Both levies serve to satisfy the auto-financing constraint j AFC , 
which is a function of the world price, while the latter is a function of world-wide 
adoption of the new technology (Combette et al., 1997):   








j EU j W j j Q p p Q Q p p p AFC , , , , , , , , )) ( ( ) ))( ( ( )) ( ( ρ τ ρ τ ρ + + =  
0 )) ( )( ( , , , , = − − + − j W j
i
j EU j j b j a p p C Q Q ρ  (18) 
 
The levies have to fill the gap between the world price pj(ρW,j) and the high internal 
price 
i
j EU p ,  for within-quota production in excess of consumption that has to be 
exported on the world market. If the auto-financing constraint does not solve by 
combining (18) and (19), the system (18) and (20) is solved. Finally, when the latter 
neither yields a solution, a multiplicator α is defined solving the system (18) and (21). 
)) ( ( , j W j
a
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By imputing the technology-induced world price pj(ρW,j) into the auto-financing 
constraint (equation 18), the system of equations (18) to (21) yields an estimate of the 
levies )) ( ( , j W j
a
j p ρ τ  and  )) ( ( , j W j
b
j p ρ τ  that have to be imposed on quota-production   21
to satisfy the auto-financing constraint. This specification clearly visualizes how the 
levies are a function of the world price, while the latter is a function of world-wide 
adoption of the new technology. A technology-induced decline in the world price 
would widen the gap between the world and the intervention price, and hence 
engender an increase in A and B levies. The CMO for sugar allows some Member 
States to apply higher intervention prices. For each Member State, A and B quota 
prices can be deducted from the country-specific intervention prices
i
j i p ,  and the EU-
specific A and B levies: 
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By imputing pj(ρW,j) into equations 22 and 23, the model allows us to transform 
technology-induced changes in world price into domestic quota price changes. This 
auto-financing system explains why B quota prices are more variable and sensitive to 
world prices. For 1992-1993 for example, Combette, Giraud-Héraut and Réquillart 
(1997) report price transmission coefficients between 0 and 0.11 for A sugar and 
between 0.11 and 0.62 for B sugar. This is consistent with Devadoss and Kropf 
(1996), who find an overall price transmission coefficient of 0.48. Thus, the producer 
price is endogenous since it depends on sugar production, internal demand and the 
gap between the intervention and the world price. In some EU Member States (Spain, 
Ireland, Italy, Greece, the Netherlands, and the UK) processors pay a weighted-
average price for beet covering all within-quota sugar, based on domestic quota prices 
and world prices (Combette et al., 1997). In those cases, the impact of changes in 
minimum producer prices is masked for farmers, though it is fully felt by processors 
(Harris and Tangermann, 1993). All out of quota production is called ‘C sugar’ and   22 
can either be (1) stocked
11 to be carried over to the following marketing year, 
enabling to smooth out annual production variations, or (2) exported on the world 
market at the world price, i.e. without
12 export subsidies.  
 
Finally, the EU’s CMO for sugar contains some additional features, such as the ACP 
import arrangements, conferring free access to the EU market for ACP countries, up 
to a certain maximum limit. These arrangements are essentially aid flows accruing to 
ACP countries and are omitted from our welfare framework, since they do not
13 affect 
the flow of research benefits. The same argument holds for the EU’s stocking and 
carrying-over policy. Since this policy is not likely to affect the flow of research 
benefits, at least in the medium
14 and long run, it is omitted from our model. 
 
The opposite effects of cost-reduction and depression of world and domestic prices, 
both engendered by the new technology, are transmitted to average land rents through 
equation (3) by imputing the corresponding prices and adoption rates. Note that the 
land rents are a function of (1) the region-specific and (2) the world-wide adoption 
rates, the latter through the world price:  [ ] j i j W j
a
j i j i p p , , , , )), ( ( ρ ρ π  for A quota, 
[ ] j i j W j
b
j i j i p p , , , , )), ( ( ρ ρ π  for B quota, and  [ ] j i j W j j i p , , , ), ( ρ ρ π  for C sugar beets. The 
corresponding surplus changes can now be computed using standard procedures (Just 
et al., 1982). If  ) ( , π j i L  denotes the optimal allocation of land to sugar beets in 
country  i in year j, the variation in producer surplus (relative to the benchmark 
without adoption) due to the innovation can be calculated according to an elegant 
methodology of Moschini, Lapan, and Sobolevski (2000), and adapted to the EU’s 
CMO for sugar. Figure 2 shows graphically how innovation rents can be measured in 
the land market. The producer surplus change strongly depends on the   23
competitiveness of the country in sugar production. Therefore, we introduce a new 
categorical parameter φi,j to denote the region’s production efficiency. Depending on 
the value this parameter takes, the model chooses the appropriate formula for the 
calculation of the welfare effects. The change in producer surplus of a high-cost 
country i that only produces A sugar, without fulfilling it’s A quota (φi,j = 0, S0 in 
Figure 2), can be computed as: 
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Note that the benefit resulting from the technology not only depends on the adoption 
within the region, but also on world-wide adoption rates through the technology-
induced world price depreciation. The innovation rents of medium-cost countries, 
fulfilling their A quota but not their B quota (φi,j = 1, S1 in Figure 2), can be calculated 
as follows:   
j c b a j d e e d c b a p PS j i j W j j i + − + = + + + − − − + = ∆ ) ( ) ), ( ( , , , ρ ρ  (25) 
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a
j i Q ,   and 
b
j i Q ,  represent respectively the A and B quota. For exporting low-cost EU 
countries responding to world prices (φi,j = 3, S3 in Figure 2), the change in producers’ 
surplus is:    24 
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Figure 1 illustrates graphically how the benefits are split up in (1) a within-quota (area 
b – a), and (2) an out-of-quota part (area d – c), earned on the world market. For 
regions in the ROW responding to world prices (φi,j = 5), innovation rents can be 
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In specifying equation (6), we assumed that exporting low-cost EU or ROW regions 
not responding to world prices have no possibilities for output expansion. Instead, 
they will respond to new technologies by freeing up land allocated to sugar beets, so 


























   25
possibility by equaling their land supply function to their constant total production, 
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The change in producers’ surplus for exporting low-cost EU regions not responding to 
world prices (φi,j = 2) can be graphically visualized in Figure 2. The land supply 
function S2 shows that these regions would normally not supply C-sugar, since the 
rents of the latter are not sufficient to cover production costs. However, in order to 
ensure that his quotas are fulfilled, even in low-yield years, farmers choose to accept a 
minimal precautionary overproduction. This overproduction leads to a financial loss 
(areas w + x + α + β in the pre-innovation case and areas t + w in the post-innovation 
case), which can be considered as a risk premium, paid by the farmer to ensure his 
quota-fulfillment. Graphically, innovation rents would be calculated as: 
  d e f g h h g f e d c b a p PS j i j W j j i + + + + + − − − − − − + = ∆ ) ), ( ( , , , ρ ρ  (29)   
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Note that these innovation rents equal the innovation rents of price-responsive regions 
minus the area γ, plus the area β. The area γ can be interpreted as the rents that would 
be captured by having the possibility to expand land (from  c L  to  c L ˆ  in Figure 2), 
purely in response of the profit increase, disregarding any yield-effect. The area β is a 
part of the risk premium that is eliminated by the land-contracting effect of the new 
technology. Area β is difficult to measure and depends strongly on farmers’ and 
processors’ risk aversion. While we observe full quota fulfilment and C-sugar 
production for these countries, we know that their land supply function is more   26 
closely related to S2 than to S3. Since data is lacking for precise vertical positioning of 
the latter, we will assume the same land supply function for price-responsive and 
price-irresponsive regions. The measurement error that results from this simplification 
equals area β minus area γ and is assumed to be small for price-irresponsive regions
15. 
Therefore, the change in producers’ surplus of these regions will be calculated with 
equation (26). For regions in the ROW not responding to world prices (φi,j = 4) 
finally, innovation rents are computed with equation (27) for the same reason.  
 
The EU’s aggregate producer surplus change is simply the sum of all production 
blocks’ producer surplus changes: 
) ), ( ( ) ), ( ( , ,
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In Figure 1, the aggregate benefit for the EU can be assessed by a pivotal shift of the 
aggregate EU supply function (from QEU,j(p,0) to QEU,j(p,ρEU,j)). Qd (= Qa + Qb – C) 
represents the within-quota production in excess of domestic consumption C, which is 
exported on the world market. This exported production is subsidized, since it 
receives the guaranteed B quota price, while it is exported at the world price. Decline 
of the world price from pj(0) to pj(ρW,j), due to the technology-induced shift of EU 
aggregate supply, raises subsidy costs up to Qd (pj(0) – pj(ρW,j)), represented by the 
lower area a. These extra costs have to be borne by the producers via increased levies 
on their within-quota production (equations 18 to 23). In most cases, adapting only 
the B quota levy is sufficient, visualized in Figure 1 through a decline of the B quota 
price from  )) 0 ( ( , j
b
j i p p  to  )) ( ( , , j W j
b
j i p p ρ . This means that the cost for the producers is 




j i b p p p p Q ρ − , represented by the upper area a, which is essentially   27
the same as the lower area a. Thus, the total within-quota benefits equal the difference 
between areas b and a. To these rents, out-of-quota benefits have to be added, 
represented by the difference between areas d and c. The EU’s change in consumer 
surplus can be modeled as: 
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In our model however, the EU’s intervention price is fixed, so it is neither a function 
of the world price, nor the adoption rate within the EU: 
i
j EU j EU j W j
i
j EU p p p , , , , ) ), ( ( = ρ ρ       (32) 
This means that technology-induced welfare effects for consumers would only be 
possible within the CMO for sugar if the EU endogenized
16 world prices and/or 
technology adoption rates in their intervention price. 
  
Analogous to equation (31), the ROW aggregate innovation rents (area g – area e in 
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Finally, to calculate the profit of the input suppliers, we need an estimate for all 
regions  i  of the supply of land to the sugar beet industry in equilibrium: 
] ), ( [ , , , j i j W j j i p L ρ ρ . Note again the double dependence of land supply on local as well 
as global adoption rates, the latter through the technology-induced world price   28 
depreciation. Again, through equation (28), we include the possibility for some 
regions not responding to world prices, to respond to the new technology by freeing 
up land allocated to sugar beets instead. An apparent contradiction now emerges: in 
some regions belonging to a quota system, the yield-increasing effect of both a new 
technology either a higher price, the latter through the (optimal) yield function, can 
negatively affect its demand through a reduction of allocated land. The profit of the 
input suppliers can now be computed as: 
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Total welfare increase is simply:            (36) 
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Finally, by using a risk adjusted rate of return derived from the capital asset pricing 
model (CAPM), d, we can aggregate all year-specific welfare changes and actualize 
them to the year 2001-2002: 
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In equations (37) to (42) p(ρW) is a 1x6 vector of functions pj(ρW,j). ρEU, ρROW, and ρW 
are respectively a 14x6 matrix, 2x6 matrix, and 16x6 matrix of adoption rates. 
 
EUWABSIM 
Our theoretical framework is materialized in the simulation model ‘EUWABSIM’. 
This software package is made up of three interlaced components: (1) an Excel 
module for data management, (2) a Mathcad module, containing the mathematical 
body of the model, and (3) an @Risk module, containing the ‘uncertainty element’ of 
the model, for carrying out sensitivity and scenario analyses. Using stochastic 
sensitivity analysis via @Risk, subjective prior distributions of non-deterministic 
parameters (elasticities, yield increases, cost reductions, technology price markup, 
etc.) are included to generate posterior distributions of the outcomes (counterfactual 
world price and research benefits) of the model (Davis and Espinoza, 1998). In this 
paper however, we only report the means of the obtained distributions. 
 
Data and Model Calibration 
In our simulation model we assume hypothetically
17 that the European Union’s sugar 
industry, as a competitive player in the world market, and the ROW Beet region 
embraced the new technology since the marketing year 1996/97, and progressively 
adopted it up to 2000/01. Since we use an ex ante research framework, our model is 
calibrated on the observed production data from this period, i.e. without adoption of 
the new technology
18. First of all we need a rough
19 estimate of the observed initial 
(before adoption) land rent  j i, ˆ π  in all regions. Then, observed yields (yi,j), ‘incentive 
prices’ ( j i p , ˆ  which can be  )) 0 ( ( , j
a
j i p p ,  )) 0 ( ( , j
b
j i p p  or pj(0)), quantities ( j i Q , ) and   30 
quota (
a
j i Q ,  and 
b
j i Q , ) are taken from various sources (European Commission, 1999, 
F.O.Licht, 2000, European Commission, 2000, F.O.Licht, 2001, FAO, 2002).  
 
The estimate of the cost reduction induced by the introduction of the new technology 
is crucial to the economic surplus calculation. Due to the absence of farm-level 
adoption in the EU, we combine information from field trials with production cost 
data from national farm surveys and Eurostat to calibrate the technology-specific 
parameters αi,j and βi. Field trials suggest that yield boosts (βi) vary from 0 % to 8 % 
(Wevers, 1998, Richard-Molard and Gestat de Garambe, 1998, Dewar, 2000, 
Bückmann et al., 2000, Jassem, 2000). Hence, for this parameter we define a 
conservative triangular distribution with a minimum of zero, a most likely value of 
2 % and a maximum of 5 %.  
 
Average herbicide costs and application costs for all EU countries are reported by 
Hermann (1996, 1997). The change in weeding costs (αi,j) is calculated by taking the 
difference between the conventional reported average herbicide and application costs 
and the costs that would be generated in a comparable system in which the 
combination of glyphosate
20 and GT sugar beet seed is used. For the Northern 
countries (Belgium + Luxembourg, Denmark, Germany, France, Ireland, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Austria, Finland, Sweden, UK), characterized by a herbicide application 
rate of at least 2.5 applications, the GT system is based on a glyphosate dose of 6 liter, 
sprayed through an average of 2.5 applications (2 times 3 liter of 3 times 2 liter). For 
Southern countries (Greece, Spain, and Portugal), the average application rate is at 
most 1.5 applications. In these cases, the counterfactual GT system is assumed to be a 
one-pass application of 3 liter glyphosate. We further assume an exogenously fixed   31
price decline of 20 % in the market of conventional herbicides, due to the competition 
effect between the conventional and the new technology. The fixed per-hectare 
profitability parameter αi,j is a result of the before-mentioned factors. As a first step, 
we do not include any distribution for this parameter, but shift all uncertainty to the 
potential price markup of HT sugar beets. Due to the very close connection between 
αi,j, the adoption pattern, the conventional herbicide price decline, and the potential 
price markup, a wide distribution for the latter is used to incorporate all uncertainty 
regarding the potential average per-hectare profitability of the new technology.  
 
Since nowhere in the world any market has developed yet, no information is available 
on price premiums in this non-competitive market. We assume that the observed price 
markup of 40 % for US Roundup Ready™ soybeans consists in an upper limit. Using 
a static framework for France, Lemarié et al. (2001) also find an optimal price markup 
of 40 % for the commercialization of HT sugar beets. We expect price premiums to be 
lower in the EU, compared to the US, due to the negative public opinion and the 
hesitant behavior of EU Member States regarding transgenic crops. We also assume 
that the input industry would sufficiently lower its prices in the early adoption stage 
(even to zero) to penetrate the market. Due to the large uncertainty regarding price 
premiums (µi,j), we incorporate a wide triangular distribution of potential price 
premiums with a minimum of zero, a most likely value of 20 % and a maximum of 40 
%. Inspired by the Roundup Ready™ soybeans case in the US, we assume that the 
input supplier will not apply any regional price differentiation in the EU, but instead 
we allow price differentiation between the EU and the ROW. Hence, in this paper we 
only focus on technological uncertainties, such as the potential yield boost βI and 
price markup  j i, µ .
21   32 
Supply and demand elasticities and their respective standard errors are taken from 
literature. The work of Poonyth et al. (2000) is particularly interesting since it reports 
very reliable estimates for each EU member country’s elasticity of land supply with 
respect to sugar beet prices, defined as ψ = (∂L/∂p)(p/L). Given these estimates, the 
parameter θ is calibrated as (Moschini et al., 2000): 
j i j i
j i i
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Devadoss and Kropf (1996) report supply elasticities for all major sugar producers in 
the world. For the ROW Cane and ROW Beet regions in our model, a production-
weighted average is calculated of the reported supply elasticities. Since these 
elasticities already incorporate yield response to prices, we set ηi = 0 in these regions. 
For EU regions we set ηi = 0.05, inspired by Moschini, Lapan, and Sobolevski (2000).   
 
Given the assumed, estimated and retrieved parameters, structural parameters, such as 
Ai,j, Gi,j, and λi,j will be calibrated so as to retrieve acreage, quantity, yield and price 
data for the period 1996/97-2000/01: 
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The sugar demand elasticity of the ROW εROW,j is calibrated on the export demand 
elasticities in FAPRI’s world sugar model (equations 11 and 12), reported by Poonyth   33
et al. (1998, 2000). For this calibration step we force the market to clear (equation 16) 
after the EU technology-induced world price decline, without adoption in the ROW: 
0 ) 0 ), ( ( ) ), ( ( ) ), ( ( , , , , , = − = j EU j j EU j EU j j j EU j EU j j p ED p ES p MC ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ  (47) 
 
The scale parameter κj is calibrated on the observed sugar demand in the ROW 
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We finally introduce technological change into the model by assuming an exogenous 
logistic adoption curve (Griliches, 1957): 
) 1 ( ,
j b a
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i i e K
+ + = ρ         ( 5 0 )  
To have a comparing point, we first estimate the parameters of the adoption curve of a 
comparable biotechnology innovation in the US. We believe that the US case of HT 
Roundup Ready™ soybeans is comparable to the EU’s case of HT sugar beets, 
because of (1) the common herbicide tolerance technology, (2) the importance of the 
crop in total production and in most Member States, and (3) the importance of the 
export of the refined products of both crops. Assuming an adoption ceiling of 75 % 
we find estimates of 2.76 for a and -0.85 for the adoption speed b. Since we do not 
have any information on the potential adoption curve of HT sugar beets in the EU, we   34 
assume that the observed adoption pattern of Roundup Ready™ soybeans in the US is 
an upper limit. Since no significant adoption is expected to occur before 2005 (Table 
3), we assume a hypothetical adoption pattern with half the speed, i.e. b = -0.43, of 
the observed adoption pattern of Roundup Ready™ soybeans in the US. In Figure 3, 
both curves are visualized. We allow technology spillovers to the ROW Beet region, 
subject to the same hypothetical adoption pattern, but assume a ceteris paribus 
without adoption in the ROW Cane region
22. Due to the exogeneity of adoption in our 
model, our welfare calculations have to be interpreted as functions, conditional on this 
adoption pattern. In other words, we calculate the ‘average welfare effects foregone’, 
associated with a hypothetical logistic adoption pattern at half the speed of US 
Roundup Ready™ soybean adoption. 
 
A final crucial parameter to be assessed is φi,j, the region’s production efficiency. 
Portugal and Greece are the only countries that not consistently fulfill their A quotas 
(φi,j = 0). On the other extreme, Frandsen et al. (2001) argue that in the EU, only four 
countries can be considered responding significantly to world sugar prices (φi,j = 3): 
Austria, France, Germany, and the UK. Depending on the marketing year, the other 
EU countries exhibit a production efficiency somewhere between these two extremes 
(φi,j = 1, 2). Among the sugar beet producing regions, the EU is considered to be one 
of the most efficient producers (Haley, 1998). Moreover, the US sugar sector, 
belonging to the ROW beet region is highly protected by a tariff quota system, 
eliminating any link between domestic prices and supply and world prices (Roberts 
and Wish-Wilson, 1991). Therefore, we assume that the highly protected ROW beet 
region will not export its technology-induced surplus on the world market, but instead 
will free up land allocated to sugar beets (φi,j = 4). The ROW cane industry is   35
assumed to respond to world prices (φi,j = 5), but due to the ceteris paribus 




In Table 6 the effects of the introduction of HT sugar beets in the EU and the ROW 
on world and domestic EU prices as well as on producers’ and consumers’ welfare 
and input suppliers’ profits are summarized. The second column represents the 
benchmark year 1996/97 in which no adoption is assumed. The next five columns 
represent the five subsequent agricultural seasons of adoption. The last column 
represents the aggregation of the welfare effects, actualized to the year 2001/02, using 
a risk adjusted rate of return of 10.5%.  
 
Surprisingly, the model results suggest that the largest share (53 %) of the benefits is 
accruing to the ROW if we assume that beet producers in these (mostly industrial) 
countries (1) are able to achieve the same efficiency-enhancing effects through the use 
of the new technology and (2) are not able to export the technology-induced surplus 
on the world market and further significantly erode world market prices. Total 
producers’ surplus increase is 949 million €. Despite the fact that the EU and the 
ROW produce roughly the same quantity of sugar, the technology rents are not 
equally shared among these regions. EU producers absorb 345 million €, while ROW 
beet growers extract 605 million €, respectively 36 % and 64 % of total producers’ 
surplus. This is due to the fact that the innovation engenders an important fixed per-
hectare benefit αi,j, such that, to some extent, the benefit sharing reflects the land 
sharing between these two regions (respectively 31 % and 69 % of total land allocated   36 
to sugar beet, Table 2). The depressing effect on world prices, engendered by 
innovating world price responsive regions, is profitable for ROW consumers, who 
gain 323 million €, but is completely offset by the loss of ROW cane growers, 
accounting for 316 million €. The net effect is that roughly half of the benefits spills 
over to the ROW. 
 
Since we assumed no technology-induced export expansion in the ROW, due to high 
government interventions, these spillovers do not affect the EU through depressing 
world prices. Instead, the world price responsive part of EU sugar supply will have a 
negative effect on world and EU domestic prices and producers’ welfare, but this 
effect is small. The model suggests that a minor world price decline of 0.29 % is 
expected to occur after 5 years of adoption, given the assumed adoption pattern. This 
price decline is only partially (27.6 %) transmitted to domestic B sugar prices, 
declining by only 0.08 % during the same period. The EU sugar industry captures the 
next largest share of the benefits (345 million €, i.e. 30 %).  
 
Since EU intervention prices are exogenously fixed each year, no domestic price 
declines are engendered by the introduction of the technology. As a result, EU 
consumers do not take part in the distribution of the gains from the innovation. 
Therefore when modern (bio)technologies are introduced in commodity markets 
subject to obsolete trade policies, the natural flow of domestic benefits from the input 
industry, via farmers, to consumers is hampered and biased towards the producing 
sector (input industry and farmers), leaving domestic consumers unaffected. 
Remarkably, consumers outside the EU gain while EU citizens continue to subsidize 
EU sugar production trough high sugar prices, despite the innovation. Therefore, trade   37
policies should at least endogenize the effects of technologies that have an important 
impact on societal welfare, such as agricultural biotechnology. 
   
The smallest share of the benefits (194 million €, i.e. 17 %) finally, accrues to the 
monopolistic input industry (seed suppliers and gene developers). The limited ability 
of the input industry to extract a large part of the benefits can be explained by the fact 
that in a quota system, producers not responding to world prices will decrease their 
land supply to the sugar industry, rather than increase it. This negatively affects 
demand for the new technology. The aggregated global welfare increase after five 
years of adoption amount to roughly one billion €.  
 
Extensions of the Model 
A first interesting extension to the model has been the inclusion of social costs due to 
environmental externalities, elaborated in Demont et al. (2002). Detailed information 
is needed about the current externalities, occurring in conventional sugar beet 
growing, as well as a methodology to valorize these externalities and translate them 
into social costs. These costs can be included into the welfare framework. They cause 
a negative shift of the supply curve, enabling to partition the benefits and costs 
between producers and environment (Alston et al., 1995). 
 
Secondly, as a first pass we assumed an exogenous adoption curve and a distribution 
of possible price markups while in reality these parameters are endogenous variables 
of the model. Adoption will depend on profit, which depends, in its turn, on the price 
of the innovation. Reversely, the price markup depends on demand (adoption), which 
depends on profit. An extension could be to endogenize these variables in the model.   38 
However, actual consumer and political resistance towards GMO’s, especially in the 
European Union, has shown that the simplified scheme of adoption we just outlined, 
does not hold any longer. Especially in the case of the sugar sector, sugar and sugar 
beet demand is very concentrated. If one of the major clients (e.g. Coca Cola) refuses 
sugar produced with GM sugar beets, processors will change their contracts towards 
producers and force them to produce GM-free. Hence, the adoption decisions of the 
latter are no longer autonomous as in the past with previous agricultural innovations. 
Thus, the combination of uncertainty and a strongly concentrated sugar industry will 
complicate the endogenization of adoption and biotechnology pricing policies in the 
model. 
 
Finally, an extension could be to re-run the model for different scenarios of 
liberalization of the EU’s sugar CMO. These studies would illustrate the distortions 
that occur in the interaction between policies and modern agricultural innovations and 
that would prevent the benefits from R&D to flow from beet growers to consumers. 
 
Conclusions 
We showed that the EU’s sugar market could serve as a relevant case study for the 
calculation of the ex ante welfare effects of agricultural biotechnology in the EU. 
Therefore, we developed a theoretical welfare framework shaped to the characteristics 
of the EU’s Common Market Organization (CMO) for sugar. The result is the 
simulation model ‘EUWABSIM’, which enables to assess the size and distribution of 
the benefits of transgenic sugar beet adoption in the European Union and the Rest of 
the World. 
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Since only two gene developers (Monsanto and Aventis) and three seed companies 
(KWS, Advanta and Novartis) dominate the market for GM sugar beet seeds, seed 
prices will be higher compared with a competitive market. As a result, some benefits 
will accrue to input suppliers in the form of ‘oligopolistic rents’. However, due to the 
presence of alternative non-GM technologies, the input sector pricing decisions are 
bounded by the producers’ adoption incentive. Consequently, producers will be able 
to extract a part of the benefits, in most cases a within-quota benefit that is more or 
less protected from price depreciation. Low cost producers will gain some additional 
benefits on the world market. However, declining word prices, since the EU is an 
important player in international sugar trade, will dampen these producer surplus 
increases. The outcome for producers in the rest of the world will depend on 
technology adoption and on structural parameters of the world sugar trade. Since the 
ROW Cane region is lagging behind the EU, due to our ceteris paribus focus, 
competition on the world market between the two players will adversely affect ROW 
cane producers and reversely. Given that quota prices for both growers and processors 
are fixed, there is no rent in this model that accrues to processors. Due to fixed 
internal sugar prices, EU consumers will not see any price change or welfare increase 
in the short run. ROW consumers will gain, due to the depressing effect of the 
technology on world prices. In literature there is widespread belief that positive 
environmental externalities of HT sugar beets (declining herbicide use and toxicity) 
exceed negative ones (gene flow risks, weed resistance, etc.). Hence, net benefits, or 
more correct a reduction in current negative externalities (social costs), are expected 
to flow to the environment. Finally, since the CMO for sugar is largely self-financing 
from a public financing perspective, neither public expenditures – except for public 
biotechnology R&D in the sugar sector – nor benefits will accrue to EU governments.   40 
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1 This is actually the only way benefits of technological progress end up being passed on to consumers 
in the European Union (Thirtle, 1999). 
2 However, since Europe and Japan are reluctant to accept GM pulp, up to now, the marketing concerns 
of US sugar processors have been a significant roadblock to the introduction of GM sugar beets in the 
US (Lilleboe, 2000). 
3 In this paper we will not distinguish between these two technologies and assume that their cost 
advantages will quickly converge after their introduction. While most data is available for Roundup 
Ready™ varieties, in the remainder of the paper, the term ‘herbicide tolerant sugar beets’ will refer to 
both technologies.  
4 Belgium and Luxembourg are united in one block. 
5 We are grateful to Brent Borrell for pointing this out. 
6 In the short run, these surpluses will be added to the carry-over and ‘precautionary’ production (cfr. 
infra). In the medium and long run, farmers will adapt their land allocated to sugar beet production. 
7 We convert all quantities and prices to their white sugar equivalent. Since we assume constant unit 
extraction rates and costs per member country, there is no rent in this model that accrues to processors. 
Given that for within-quota production, prices for both growers and processors are fixed, this is a 
realistic assumption. 
8 This is only true to a certain extent, since the auto-financing constraint relates world prices to 
domestic prices (equations 18 to 23). Increases in EU’s C sugar exports, due to technological change, 
engender a decline of the world price which is reflected on A and B sugar prices and finally of the 
research benefits of within-quota sugar production (see below). 
9 In our model, only regions responding to world prices are able to contribute to the technology-
induced export expansion. 
10 However, intervention is hardly used in the European sugar sector as surpluses are exported to the 
world market. The costs of keeping sugar (storage, financing, etc.) are reimbursed to manufacturers. 
11 Producers may carry over a quantity of C sugar to the following marketing year equal to a maximum 
of 20 % of their A quota (European Commission, 1996). 
12 It can be argued that even C sugar is implicitly subsidized since fixed costs of exporting producers 
are already covered by the high within-quota prices (Harris and Tangermann, 1993).   48 
                                                                                                                                            
13 Ivan Roberts correctly points out that this is so as long as the aid is maintained. But if it were to be 
discontinued, it would raise world prices, influencing C-sugar and B-sugar returns. In our framework 
however, initial returns are modelled as scaling parameters that are inconsequential to the calculated 
changes in profits due to the adoption of the technology (Moschini et al., 2000). 
14 In the short run, producers could stock and carry over surpluses generated by the innovation, but this 
‘hold-up’ of R&D benefits can only be temporal, since these stocks are limited to 20 % of the A quota. 
15 In Figure 2, this error seems to be large, but this is due to visibility-enhancing effects. In reality, this 
error is probably small, compared to the large quota rents. 
16 In contrast, world price changes are endogenous to producer prices through the auto-financing 
constraint (equation 18). 
17 As we mentioned earlier, this strategy reveals the benefits foregone or costs of the current 
moratorium on GMO’s in the EU, and more specifically on transgenic sugar beets. This implies that the 
relevant counterfactual is a situation with GMO adoption, in contrast to an ex- post setting, where the 
counterfactual is a situation without GMO adoption. Our scenario of adoption during the period 
1996/97-2000/01 is completely hypothetical, since effective adoption is not expected to occur before 
2002-2005 (Table 3). 
18 In an ex post setting, the model would be calibrated on observed production data reflecting adoption, 
like in the model of Moschini, Lapan, and Sobolevski (2000).  
19 After an extensive sensitivity analysis it appears that this is just an inconsequential scaling parameter, 
which is in line with the observations of Moschini, Lapan, and Sobolevski (2000).  
20 For simplicity we only consider the case of glyphosate tolerant Roundup Ready™ sugar beets. We 
assume that the overall profitability (including the price premium) of glyphosate and glufosinate 
ammonium tolerant Liberty Link™ sugar beet seeds would converge after the introduction of both 
products on the market and that possible differences would be outweighed by the more important 
uncertainty regarding the price premium of both products.  
21 In a future version of this paper, all uncertainties are analysed, including structural modelling 
uncertainties regarding elasticities and calibration parameters which are difficult to estimate. In this 
paper however we want to focus on the two main uncertainties regarding the new technology.   49
                                                                                                                                            
22 Note that an important part of the world is not able to adopt the new technology, since we are only 
focusing on one technology, i.e. herbicide tolerance in the sugar beet sector. As a result, in our model 
the technology cannot ‘spillover’ to the ROW cane region. This ceteris paribus point of view implies 
that the ROW cane region is ‘lagging behind’ the EU in adopting the new technology. In reality, the 
opposite may happen if herbicide tolerant sugar cane varieties are timely introduced in the ROW and if 
adoption in the EU continues to be very slow. But again, we have set up our framework to estimate 
‘what could have been if’, rather than ‘what will be’. Although influencing the size of the benefits 
substantially, the assumption of an exogenous adoption curve does not influence the distribution of the 
benefits as long as the same adoption patterns are assumed. Since it is difficult to obtain information on 
potential adoption rates in all regions, the estimated welfare effects should be interpreted as functions, 
conditional on adoption rates.   50 
Table 1: Sugar Production and Utilization, Five-Year Average (1996/97-2000/01) 






































EU  (15)  18.406  9  18.415  14% 8.398  20% 3.790  -10.475  14.261 
Eastern Europe  7.984  0  7.984  6%  1.611  4%  -6.385  193  14.177 
Other Western 
Europe 
3.137  0 3.137  2%  425  1%  -151  10.997 3.112 
USA  4.056  3.126  7.181 6% 226 1%  -1.747 169  9.081 
Japan  662 180 841 1%  6 0%  -1.588 -76  2.506 
Canada 121  0  121  0%  19  0%  -1.108  -1  1.230 
Australia  0 5.311 5.311  4% 3.975  10% 3.972  44 1.103 
Brazil  0  17.517  17.517  13% 8.356  20% 8.356  189 9.293 
India  0  16.959  16.959  13% 457 1% -46 475  16.525 
Indonesia  0 1.913 1.913  1%  7  0%  -1.507  110 3.243 
Mexico  0  5.102  5.102 4% 645 2% 583  23  4.501 
South  Africa  0 2.628 2.628  2% 1.249  3% 1.152  78 4.070 
Thailand  0 5.391 5.391  4% 3.457  8% 3.457  122 1.813 
Other Central 
America 
0 8.600 8.600  7% 5.728  14% 5.220  127 2.954 
Other South 
America 
483 6.270 6.753  5% 1.687  4%  592  152 6.012 
Other  Africa  623 5.901 6.524  5% 2.487  6%  -3.603  356 7.215 
Other  Asia  1.962 13.418 15.380  12%  2.687  6% -8.955  192 24.151 
Other  Oceania  0 414 414 0% 348 1%  76  21 309 
World  37.433 92.738  130.171  100% 41.767  100%  2.107  2.696  125.556 
Share  29%  71%  100%          51
Table 2: Area and Production of Sugar Beets and Beet Sugar in the World, Five-























Austria  47 1%  2.969 1% 63  16%  476 1% 
Belgium-
Luxembourg 
96 1%  5.927 2% 62  16%  960 3% 
Danmark  63 1%  3.369 1% 54  16%  532 2% 
Finland  33 1%  1.108 0% 33  14%  153 0% 
France  440  7%  31.259 12%  71  14%  4.410 13% 
Germany  480  7%  26.480 10%  55  16%  4.211 12% 
Greece  45 1%  2.663 1% 59  11%  286 1% 
Ireland  33 1%  1.708 1% 52  13%  217 1% 
Italy  270 4%  12.958 5% 48  12%  1.606 5% 
the 
Netherlands 
114 2%  6.531 3% 58  15%  1.012 3% 
Portugal  6 0%  361 0% 58  15%  53 0% 
Spain  137 2%  8.110 3% 59  14%  1.136 3% 
Sweden  58 1%  2.592 1% 45  16%  407 1% 
UK  184 3%  9.786 4% 53  15%  1.475 4% 
EU(15)  2.005 31%  115.819 46%  58  15%  16.934 49% 
Hungary  69 1%  2.973 1% 43  15%  432 1% 
Czech  Rep.  74 1%  3.244 1% 44  15%  488 1% 
Poland  368 6%  13.951 5% 38  15%  2.044 6% 
Russia  761  12%  13.697 5% 18  11%  1.500 4% 
Ukraine  879  14%  15.188 6% 17  13%  1.975 6% 
Turkey  434 7%  17.939 7% 41  13%  2.289 7% 
Other  443 7%  12.580 5% 29  12%  1.503 4% 
Europe  5.034 78%  195.391 77%  39  14%  27.165 79% 
US  568  9%  27.959 11%  49  13%  3.731 11% 
China  406 6%  11.410 4% 28  10%  1.103 3% 
Iran  178 3%  4.784 2% 27  12%  564 2% 
Other  292 5%  14.718 6% 37  13%  1.875 5% 
ROW  4.474 69%  138.443 54%  31  13%  17.505 51% 
World  6.479 100%  254.263 100%  39  14%  34.438 100% 
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Table 4: Spatial Dimension of the Model 





BL  DK D G E F IRL I NL A  P FIN S UK 
 
Table 5: Temporal Dimension of the Model 
j  0  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Year 1996-1997 
Benchmark 
1996-1997 1997-1998 1998-1999 1999-2000 2000-2001 2001-2002 
Evaluation 
 
Table 6: Average Price and Welfare Effects (in ∈) due to the Introduction of 
Herbicide Tolerant Sugar Beets in the EU and the ROW 
Year 1996/97 
Benchm. 
1996/97 1997/98 1998/99 1999/00 2000/01  2001/2002 
Aggregated 
World  Price  100,00% 99,88% 99,88% 99,81% 99,76% 99,71%  0 
A Beet Price  100,00%  100,00%  100,00%  100,00%  100,00%  100,00%  0 
B  Beet  Price  100,00% 99,95% 99,96% 99,95% 99,96% 99,92%  0 
ROW  Cane  0 -38.587.121 -36.757.489 -39.709.121 -43.782.468 -85.764.328 -316.131.971 
ROW  Beet  0 50.929.644 70.779.275 86.912.966  104.519.112  160.899.907 604.789.820 
Belgium  +  Lux.  0 1.076.162 1.584.756 2.544.091 2.715.700 3.858.315 14.969.738 
Danmark  0  786.710 1.158.030 1.478.211 1.967.714 2.751.737 10.337.818 
Germany  0 6.062.648 8.786.850  11.173.670  15.059.855  21.585.928 79.467.881 
Greece  0  832.805 1.061.482 1.362.588 2.129.391 2.678.090 10.231.423 
Spain  0 2.597.248 3.623.578 4.622.465 5.835.492 8.608.548 32.171.024 
France  0 4.808.968 7.602.577 8.555.833  11.298.548  17.550.909 63.240.882 
Ireland  0 271.502 380.273 491.602 643.701 971.626 3.496.003 
Italy  0 6.373.004 7.149.535 7.389.823 9.975.570  25.788.252 71.004.792 
Netherlands  0  871.902 1.272.878 2.146.741 2.107.419 3.208.061 12.203.983 
Austria  0  863.869 1.263.049 1.582.026 2.086.615 2.825.450 10.978.974 
Portugal  0  11.700 292.158 380.715 572.580 677.430 2.391.317 
Finland  0  591.105  802.680 1.233.718 1.479.269 2.032.431  7.794.853 
Sweden  0  602.088  882.777 1.120.640 1.526.689 2.168.782  7.986.668 
UK  0 1.437.253 2.209.844 2.498.791 3.323.735 4.983.694 18.379.815 
∆PSEU,j  0 27.186.963 38.070.464 46.580.912 60.722.279 99.689.252 344.655.172 
∆CSEU,j  0 0 0 0 0 0  0 
∆PSROW,j  0 12.342.524 34.021.786 47.203.845 60.736.644 75.135.580 288.657.849 
∆CSROW,j  0 39.321.066 37.310.643 41.589.491 47.306.907 84.256.010 323.232.065 
∏j  0 15.718.542 21.080.066 28.912.352 39.083.184 47.644.288 194.359.903 
Total  0  94.569.095 130.482.959 164.286.600 207.849.014 306.725.130 1.150.904.989 
∆PSEU,j  Share  . 29% 29% 28% 29% 33%  30% 
∆CSEU,j  Share  . 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%  0% 
NetROWj  Share  . 55% 55% 54% 52% 52%  53% 
∏j Share  . 17% 16% 18% 19% 16%  17% 
Total  . 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%  100% 
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Figure 3: Estimated Logistic Adoption Curve of RR® Soybeans in the US and 
Hypothetic Half-Speed Adoption Curve of HT Sugar Beets in the EU 
 
   56 
List of Available Working Papers 
 
 
nr.  1  BEERLANDT, H. en L. DRIESEN, Criteria ter evaluatie van 'duurzame 
landbouw', Afdeling Landbouweconomie, K.U.Leuven, januari 1994, 35 p. 
 
nr.  2  BEERLANDT, H. en L. DRIESEN, Evaluatie van herbicide-resistente 
planten aan criteria voor duurzame landbouw, Afdeling Landbouweconomie, 
K.U.Leuven, januari 1994, 39 p. 
 
nr. 3  BEERLANDT, H. en L. DRIESEN, Evaluatie van bovine somatotropine aan 
criteria voor duurzame landbouw, Afdeling Landbouweconomie, 
K.U.Leuven, januari 1994, 63 p. 
 
nr. 4  BEERLANDT, H. en L. DRIESEN, Evaluatie van gemanipuleerde planten 
met biopesticide eigenschappen afkomstig van Bacillus thuringiensis aan 
criteria voor duurzame landbouw, Afdeling Landbouweconomie, 
K.U.Leuven, januari 1994, 32 p. 
 
nr.  5  BEERLANDT, H. en L. DRIESEN, Evaluatie van haploide planten aan 
criteria voor duurzame landbouw, Afdeling Landbouweconomie, 
K.U.Leuven, januari 1994, 17 p. 
 
nr. 6  BEERLANDT, H. en L. DRIESEN, Evaluatie van genetische technieken voor 
diagnosebepaling, immunologische technieken ter verbetering van de 
landbouwproduktie en transgene dieren en planten als bioreactor aan criteria 
voor duurzame landbouw, Afdeling Landbouweconomie, K.U.Leuven, januari 
1994, 28 p. 
 
nr.  7  BEERLANDT, H. en L. DRIESEN, Evaluatie van verbetering van de 
stikstoffixatie bij planten aan criteria voor duurzame landbouw, Afdeling 
Landbouweconomie, K.U.Leuven, januari 1994, 17 p. 
 
nr. 8  BEERLANDT, H. en L. DRIESEN, Evaluatie van porcine somatotropine aan 
criteria voor duurzamelandbouw, Afdeling Landbouweconomie, K.U.Leuven, 
januari 1994, 29 p. 
 
nr. 9  BEERLANDT, H. en L. DRIESEN, Evaluatie van tomaten met een langere 
houdbaarheid aan criteria voor duurzame landbouw, Afdeling 
Landbouweconomie, K.U.Leuven, februari 1994, 30 p. 
 
nr. 10  CHRISTIAENSEN, L., Voedselzekerheid: van concept tot actie: een status 
questionis, Afdeling Landbouweconomie, K.U.Leuven, april 1994, 106 p. 
 
nr.  11 CHRISTIAENSEN, L. and J. SWINNEN, Economic, Institutional and 
Political Determinants of Agricultural Production Structures in Western 
Europe, Afdeling Landbouweconomie, K.U.Leuven, May 1994, 40 p. 
   57
nr. 12  GOOSSENS, F., Efficiency and Performance of an Informal Food Marketing 
System, The case of Kinshasa, Zaire, Afdeling Landbouweconomie, 
K.U.Leuven, July 1995, 41 p. 
 
nr. 13  GOOSSENS,  F.,  Failing Innovation in the Zairian Cassava Production 
System, A comparative historical analysis, Afdeling Landbouweconomie, 
K.U.Leuven, July 1995, 18 p. 
 
nr. 14  TOLLENS,  E.,  Cadre conceptuel concernant l'analyse de la performance 
économique des marchés, Projet-FAO "Approvisionnement et Distribution 
Alimentaires des Villes de l'Afrique Francophone", Afdeling 
Landbouweconomie, K.U.Leuven, août 1995, 35 p. 
(Deuxieme version, avril 1996) 
 
nr. 15  TOLLENS,  E.,  Les marchés de gros dans les grandes villes Africaines, 
diagnostic, avantages et éléments d'étude et de développement, Projet-FAO 
"ApprovisioMement et Distribution Alimentaires des Villes de l'Afrique 
Francophone", Afdeling Landbouweconomie, K.U.Leuven, août 1995, 23 p. 
(Deuxieme version, septembre 1996, 32 p.) 
 
nr. 16  ENGELEN, G., Inleiding tot de landbouwvoorlichting (heruitgave), Afdeling 
Landbouweconomie, K.U.Leuven, augustus 1995, 17 p. 
 
nr. 17  TOLLENS, E., Agricultural Research and Development towards Sustainable 
Production Systems: I. Information Sources, Surveys; II. Conceptualisation of 
the Change Process, NATURA-NECTAR course: "Agricultural Economics 
and Rural Development", module 1, Afdeling Landbouweconomie, 
K.U.Leuven, August 1995 
 
nr. 18  TOLLENS,  E.,  Planning and Appraising Agricultural Development 
programmes and Projects: I. Farm Planning; II. Aggregation, Sensitivity 
Analyses and Farm Investment Analysis; III. Guidelines on Informal Surveys 
and Data Collection, NATURA-NECTAR course: "Agricultural Economics 
and Rural Development", module 2, Afdeling Landbouweconomie, 
K.U.Leuven, September 1995 
 
nr. 19  TOLLENS,  E.,  Structural Adjustment and Agricultural Policies: I. Market 
Theory: the State and the Private Sector; II. Output Markets and Marketing 
Institutions; III. Input Markets; IV. Case Study: Cameroon, 
NATURA-NECTAR course: "Agricultural Economics and Policy Reforms", 
module 1, Afdeling Landbouweconomie, K.U.Leuven, September 1995 
 
nr. 20  TOLLENS,  E.,  Theory and Macro-Economic Measures of Structural 
Adjustment – Methods of Evaluation and Linkages to the Agricultural Sector: 
I. Development Models and the Role of Agriculture, NATURA-NECTAR 
course: "Agricultural Economics and Policy Reforms", module 2, Afdeling 
Landbouweconomie, K.U.Leuven, September 1995 
 
 
   58 
nr. 21  TOLLENS,  E.,  Theory and Macro-Economic Measures of Structural 
Adjustment – Methods of Evaluation and Linkages to the Agricultural Sector: 
II. Implementation of Policy Reforms: Case Study of Market Liberalisation in 
Cameroon for Cocoa and Coffee, NATURA-NECTAR course: "Agricultural 
Economics and Policy Reforms", module 2, Afdeling Landbouweconomie, 
K.U.Leuven, September 1995 
 
nr. 22  TOLLENS, E., Supply Response within the Farming Systems Context: I. Input 
Supply and Product Markets; II. Agricultural Supply Response Assessment, 
NATURA-NECTAR course: "Agricultural Economics and Policy Reforms", 
module 3, Afdeling Landbouweconomie, K.U.Leuven, September 1995 
 
nr. 23  GOOSSENS,  F.,  Agricultural Marketing and Marketing Analysis: I. 
Agricultural Marketing Research Frameworks. II. Agricultural Market 
Performance Criteria and The Role of Government Intervention, 
NATURA-NECTAR course: "Agricultural Economics and Rural 
Development", module 3, Afdeling Landbouweconomie, K.U.Leuven, 
September 1995 
 
nr. 24  GOOSSENS,  F.,  Agricultural Marketing and Marketing Analysis: Demand 
Analysis,  NATURA-NECTAR course: "Agricultural Economics and Rural 
Development", module 3, Afdeling Landbouweconomie, K.U.Leuven, 
September 1995 
 
nr.  25  CHRISTIAENSEN, L. en H. BEERLANDT, Belgische voedselhulp 
geanalyseerd met betrekking tot voedselzekerheid, Afdeling 
Landbouweconomie, K.U.Leuven, november 1994, 15 p. 
 
nr.  26  CHRISTIAENSEN, L. en H. BEERLANDT, De Belgische 
ontwikkelingssamenwerking met Rwanda geanalyseerd met betrekking tot 
voedselzekerheid, Afdeling Landbouweconomie, KU.Leuven, november 1995, 
36 p. 
 
nr. 27  BEERLANDT, H., Identificatie van de meest kwetsbaren in Monduli distrikt, 
Arusha regio, Tanzania, A.C.T.- Afdeling Landbouweconomie, K.U.Leuven, 
april 1995, 40 p. 
 
nr.  28 BEERLANDT, H., TOLLENS, E. and DERCON, S., Methodology for 
Addressing Food Security in Development Projects, Identification of the Food 
Insecure and the Causes of Food Insecurity based on Experiences from the 
Region of Kigoma, Tanzania, Department of Agncultural Economics and 
Centre for Economic Research, K.U.Leuven, Leuven, December 1995, 19 p. 
 
nr. 29  BEERLANDT,  H.,  Koppelen van noodhulp en strukturele 
ontwikkelingssamenwerking: opties voor een Belgisch beleid, Afdeling 




   59
nr.30 TOLLENS, E., La crise agraire au Zaïre: pour quelle politique de 
développement dans la phase de transition?, Une contribution au colloque “Le 
Zaïre en Chantier: Quels Projets de Societé”, Anvers, 18 février 1993, 
December 1995, 14 p. 
 
nr.31 GOOSSENS,  F.,  Rôle des systemes d'alimentation dans la securité alimentaire 
de Kinshasa, Une contribution au projet GCP/RAF/309, AGSM, FA0, mai 
1996, 78 p. 
 
nr.32  BEERLANDT, H., DERCON, S., and SERNEELS, I., (Project co-ordinator: 
E. TOLLENS), Tanzania, a Food Insecure Country?, Department of 
Agricultural Economics, Center for Economic Research, K.U.Leuven, 
September 1996, 68 p. 
 
nr. 33  TOLLENS,  E.,  Food security and nutrition 2. Case study from Tanzania, 
Nectar Programme, Agricultural Economics and Policy Reforms, module 4, 
Afdeling Landbouweconomie, K.U.Leuven, Septembre 1996, 47 p. 
 
nr. 34  BEERLANDT, H., en SERNEELS, J., Voedselzekerheid in de regio Kigoma, 
Tanzania,  Afdeling Landbouweconomie en Centrum voor Economische 
Studiën, K.U.Leuven, september 1996, 45 p. 
 
nr. 35  BEERLANDT, H., Identificatie van verifieerbare indicatoren ter toetsing van 
de voedselzekerheidssituatie in de regio Arusha, Tanzania, Afdeling 
Landbouweconomie, K.U.Leuven, november 1996, 60 p. 
 
nr. 36  GOOSSENS,  F.,  Commercialisation des vivres locaux en Afrique 
Subsaharienne, le secteur informel dans un perspectif dynamique, Une 
contribution au projet GCP/RAF/309, AGSM, FAO, novembre 1996, 58 p. 
 
nr. 37  GOOSSENS, F., The Economics of Livestock Systems: I. Marketing Problems 
and Channels of Livestock in Subsahara Africa, NATURA-NECTAR course: 
"Agricultural Economics and Rural Development", module 4, Afdeling 
Landbouweconomie, K.U.Leuven, November 1996. 
 
nr. 38  GOOSSENS, F., The Economics of Livestock Systems: II. Price Stabilization 
in the Livestock Sector, NATURA-NECTAR course: "Agricultural Economics 
and Rural Development", module 4, Afdeling Landbouweconomie, 
K.U.Leuven, November 1996. 
 
nr.39 GOOSSENS,  F.,  The Economics of Livestock Systems: III. Consumer Demand 
for Livestock Products, NATURA-NECTAR course: "Agricultural Economics 
and Rural Development, module 4, Afdeling Landbouweconomie, 
K.U.Leuven, November 1996. 
 
nr. 40  JASPERS, N., I. La Seguridad Alimenticia en el departamento de Quiché: 
Identificación e Impacto del Programa de Créditos, II. Informe Sobre Estudio 
Seguridad Alimenticia, ACT - Afdeling LandbwAuweconomie, K.U.Leuven, 
November 1996, 39 p. 
   60 
nr. 41  TOLLENS,  E.,  Social indicators with an illustration from Thailand, 
NATURA-NECTAR course: "Agricultural Economics and Policy Reforms", 
module 4, Afdeling Landbouweconomie, K.U.Leuven, January 1997, 38 p. 
 
nr.  42  BEERLANDT, H., en SERNEELS, J., Handleiding voor een 
voedselzekerheidsdiagnose,  Afdeling Landbouweconomie en Centrum voor 
Economische Studiën, K.U.Leuven, februari 1997, 131 p. 
 
nr.  43 BEERLANDT, H., and SERNEELS, J., Manual for a Food Security 
Diagnosis, Department of Agricultural Economics and Center for Economic 
Research, K.U.Leuven, March 1997, 125 p. 
 
nr. 44  GOOSSENS, F., Aangepaste vormen van samenwerking als hefboom voor de 
sociaal-economische promotie van boeren in het zuiden - algemene 
conclusies, Seminarie georganizeerd door Ieder Voor Allen, Brussel, 17-18 
maart 1997, 8 p. 
 
nr. 45  GOOSSENS,  F.,  Commercialisation des vivres locaux en Afrique 
Subsaharienne - neuf études de cas, Afdeling Landbouweconomie, 
K.U.Leuven, Mai 1997, 50 p. 
 
nr. 46  BEERLANDT, H., en SERNEELS, J., Food Security in the Kigoma Region of 
Tanzania, Department of Agricultural Economics and Center for Economic 
Research, K.U.Leuven, May 1997, 42 p. 
 
nr.  47 BEERLANDT, H., and SERNEELS, J., Manuel Pour un Diagnostic de 
Securité Alimentaire, Département d’Economie Agricole et le Centre d’Etudes 
Economiques, K.U.Leuven, Juillet 1997, 134 p. 
 
nr. 48  GOOSSENS, F., Rural Services and Infrastructure - Marketing Institutions, 
NATURA-NECTAR course: "Agricultural Economics and Policy Reforms", 
module 4, Afdeling Landbouweconomie, K.U.Leuven, June 1997, 20 p. 
 
nr. 49  TOLLENS,  E.,  International Trade and Trade Policy in Livestock and 
Livestock Products, NATURA-NECTAR COURSE: "Agricultural Economics 
and Rural Development", module 4, Afdeling Landbouweconomie, 
K.U.Leuven, October 1997,43 p. 
 
nr. 50  DESMET, A., Working towards autonomous development of local farmer 
organisations: which role for development agencies?, Department of 
Agricultural Economics and Center for Economic Research, March 1998, 49 
p. 
 
nr. 51  TOLLENS, E., Catalogue de titres dans la bibliotheque ALEO sur le Zaïre - 





   61
nr. 52  DEMONT, M., JOUVE, P., STESSENS, J., et TOLLENS, E., Evolution des 
systèmes agraires dans le Nord de la Côte d’Ivoire: les débats «  Boserup 
versus Malthus  » et «  compétition versus complémentarité  » révisités, 
Département d’Economie Agricole et de l’Environnement, K.U.Leuven, Avril 
1999, 43 p. 
 
nr.  53 DEMONT, M., and TOLLENS, E., The Economics of Agricultural 
Biotechnology: Historical and Analytical Framework, Department of 
Agricultural and Environmental Economics, K.U.Leuven, October 1999, 47 p. 
 
nr.  54 DEMONT, M., en TOLLENS, E., Biologische, biotechnologische en 
gangbare landbouw  : een vergelijkende economische studie, Afdeling 
Landbouw- en Milieueconomie, K.U.Leuven, Maart 2000, 53 p. 
 
nr. 55  DEMONT, M., JOUVE, P., STESSENS, J., and TOLLENS, E., The Evolution 
of Farming Systems in Northern Côte d’Ivoire: Boserup versus Malthus and 
Competition versus Complementarity, Department of Agricultural and 
Environmental Economics, K.U.Leuven, August 2000, 25 p. 
 
nr.  56 DEMONT, M., and TOLLENS, E., Economic Impact of Agricultural 
Biotechnology in the EU: The EUWAB-project, Department of Agricultural 
and Environmental Economics, K.U.Leuven, January 2001, 16 p. 
 
nr.  57 DEMONT, M., and TOLLENS, E., Reshaping the Conventional Welfare 
Economics Framework for Estimating the Economic Impact of Agricultural 
Biotechnology in the European Union, Department of Agricultural and 
Environmental Economics, K.U.Leuven, March 2001, 32 p. 
 
nr. 58  DEMONT, M., and TOLLENS, E., Uncertainties of Estimating the Welfare 
Effects of Agricultural Biotechnology in the European Union, Department of 
Agricultural and Environmental Economics, K.U.Leuven, April 2001, 81 p. 
 
nr. 59  DEMONT, M., and TOLLENS, E., Welfare Effects of Transgenic Sugarbeets 
in the European Union: A Theoretical Ex-Ante Framework, Department of 
Agricultural and Environmental Economics, K.U.Leuven, May 2001, 39 p. 
nr. 60  DE VENTER, K., DEMONT, M., and TOLLENS, E., Bedrijfseconomische 
impact van biotechnologie in de Belgische suikerbietenteelt, Afdeling 
Landbouw- en Milieueconomie, K.U.Leuven, Juni 2002, 66 p. 
nr. 61  DEMONT, M., and TOLLENS, E., Impact of Agricultural Biotechnology in 
the European Union’s Sugar Industry, Department of Agricultural and 
Environmental Economics, K.U.Leuven, June 2002, 55 p. 
nr.  62 DEMONT, M., and TOLLENS, E., The EUWAB-Project: Discussion, 
Department of Agricultural and Environmental Economics, K.U.Leuven, 
August 2002, 20 p. 
   62 
nr. 63  DEMONT, M., DELOOF, F. en TOLLENS, E., Impact van biotechnologie in 
Europa: de eerste vier jaar Bt maïs adoptie in Spanje, Afdeling Landbouw- en 
Milieueconomie, K.U.Leuven, Augustus 2002, 41 p. 
 
nr. 64  TOLLENS,  E.,  Food Security: Incidence and Causes of Food Insecurity 
among Vulnerable Groups and Coping Strategies, Department of Agricultural 
and Environmental Economics, K.U.Leuven, September 2002, 30 p. 
 
nr. 65  TOLLENS, E., La sécurité alimentaire: Incidence et causes de l’insécurité 
alimentaire parmi les groupes vulnérables et les strategies de lutte, 
Département d’Economie Agricole et de l’Environnement, K.U.Leuven, 
Septembre 2002, 33 p. 
 
nr. 66  TOLLENS, E., Food Security in Kinshasa, Coping with Adversity, Department 
of Agricultural and Environmental Economics, K.U.Leuven, September 2002, 
35 p. 
 
nr. 67  TOLLENS,  E.,  The Challenges of Poverty Reduction with Particular 
Reference to Rural Poverty and Agriculture in sub-Saharan Africa, 
Department of Agricultural and Environmental Economics, K.U.Leuven, 
September 2002, 31 p. 
 
nr. 68  TOLLENS,  E.,  Het voedselvraagstuk, Afdeling Landbouw- en 
Milieueconomie, K.U.Leuven, September 2002, 71 p. 
 
nr.  69 DEMONT, M., WESSELER, J., and TOLLENS, E., Biodiversity versus 
Transgenic Sugar Beet: The One Euro Question, Department of Agricultural 
and Environmental Economics, K.U.Leuven, November 2002, 33 p. 
 
nr. 70  TOLLENS, E., and DEMONT, M., Biotech in Developing Countries: From a 
Gene Revolution to a Doubly Green Revolution?, Department of Agricultural 
and Environmental Economics, K.U.Leuven, November 2002, 8 p. 
 
nr. 71  TOLLENS,  E.,  Market Information Systems in Liberalized African Export 
Markets: The Case of Cocoa in Côte d’Ivoire, Nigeria and Cameroon, 
Department of Agricultural and Environmental Economics, K.U.Leuven, 
November 2002, 19 p. 
 
nr. 72  TOLLENS,  E.,  Estimation of Production of Cassava in Bandundu (1987-
1988) and Bas Congo (1988-1989) Regions, as Compared to Official R.D. 
Congo statistics, Department of Agricultural and Environmental Economics, 
K.U.Leuven, December 2002, 29 p. 
 
nr. 73  TOLLENS, E., Biotechnology in the South: Absolute Necessity or Illusion?, 
Department of Agricultural and Environmental Economics, K.U.Leuven, 
December 2002, 29 p. 
 
nr.  74  DEMONT, M., BONNY, S., and TOLLENS, E., Prospects for GMO’s in 
Europe, Department of Agricultural and Environmental Economics, 
K.U.Leuven, January 2003. 